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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
To read the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
(IDEA)1 is to be impressed with the ambition and promise of special 
education.  The statute guarantees disabled students a “free 
appropriate public education” (FAPE) in the “least restrictive 
environment.”2  At the core of this guarantee lies an entitlement for 
the parents of a disabled child to collaborate with teachers and school 
administrators to craft an educational program that is both tailored to 
the child’s unique needs and designed to help her make progress in 
her education.  This entitlement, and the IDEA generally, represents 
an enormous advance for children with disabilities—a community 
that, for generations, passed through school with minimal learning, or 
worse, were excluded from school altogether.3 
But as is often true with respect to rights bestowed by law, 
issues of interpretation and enforcement exist.  In the context of the 
IDEA, these issues relate to what school districts are required to 
provide to disabled children and how to ensure that the districts are 
meeting those requirements.  For instance, a parent may believe that 
in order to receive an “appropriate” education, her child needs speech 
therapy in school, and a school district may believe otherwise; a 
school district may believe that a child should be placed in a 
specialized classroom for autistic children, and a parent may 
disagree; a parent may believe that her child’s progress toward 
                                                          
*Clinical Assistant Professor, University of Michigan Law School, 
Pediatric Advocacy Initiative.  I extend my gratitude to Gil Seinfeld, Paul 
Reingold, and Kim Thomas for comments and suggestions on earlier drafts.  Many 
thanks to Kristina Liu for excellent research assistance. 
 
1 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 (2006).  The Act was originally titled the 
“Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975.”  Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 
Stat. 852 (1975).  The name was changed to the “Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act” (IDEA) in 1990.  Pub. L. No. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1141-42 (1990).   
2 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1), (3) (2006).  This means that, to the maximum 
extent appropriate, disabled children are to be educated with their non-disabled 
peers. 
3 When federal special education legislation was first enacted in 1975, less 
than half of the eight million disabled children in the United States were receiving 
an appropriate education.  Nearly two million disabled children were receiving no 
education at all.  See S. REP. NO. 94-168, at 8 (1975), reprinted in 1975 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1432. 
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certain educational goals is so tenuous that she requires extended 
school year services to prevent regression, and the school district 
may regard such services as unnecessary. 
The IDEA contemplates extensive parental involvement in 
the design of an education plan appropriate to each individual child.  
When disagreements arise between parents and school districts, it 
also provides parents with access to legal remedies, including the 
ability for parents to sue to enforce the guarantees of special 
education.4  But a variety of structural and economic factors have 
prevented the fulfillment of the statute’s promise, from the 
development of appropriate individualized education programs for 
disabled students to the enforcement of the IDEA’s educational 
guarantees.  These factors include the limited ability of parents to 
collaborate effectively with school districts; a judicial construction of 
“free appropriate public education” that sets an exceedingly low bar 
for school districts; significant disparities in school districts’ and 
parents’ access to legal counsel, which affects both the bargaining 
power of parents and their ability to win a lawsuit, should they need 
to enforce the IDEA; and finally, the tension between the IDEA’s 
guarantee of a free appropriate public education and the resource 
constraints faced by school districts constantly lurks in the 
background.5 
This article highlights the myriad forces that impede the 
realization of the IDEA’s goals.  Part II gives an overview of the 
history of special education and the special education process under 
the IDEA, particularly as it relates to the cooperative development of 
an individualized education program (IEP) for a disabled child.  Part 
III examines features of the special education process that operate to 
the systematic detriment of parents, particularly low-income parents, 
and prevent them from securing an “appropriate education” for their 
children.  I am not the first to note ways in which parents are at a 
disadvantage both in negotiating with, and litigating against, school 
districts.6  What Part III does is assemble these critiques and add one 
                                                          
4 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a)(6) (2006). 
5 See infra Part III. 
6 See Eloise Pasachoff, Special Education, Poverty, and the Limits of 
Private Enforcement, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1413, 1432 (2011) (describing in 
detail the barriers that parents, especially low-income parents, face in enforcing the 
IDEA and urging greater public enforcement of the IDEA); Joanne Karger, A New 
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that has not received attention: the ability of some school districts to 
obtain insurance to cover their litigation costs should parents sue 
them under the IDEA, and the effect that this insurance has on the 
special education process.  Part IV concludes with an overview of 
recent scholarly suggestions for improvement and observations based 
on my experience practicing special education law. 
 
 
II.  THE IDEA AND THE IEP PROCESS 
 
A.  Precursors to Enactment 
 
Parents of disabled children played a significant role in the 
development and advancement of special education law.7  Between 
the 1950s and the early 1970s, parents lobbied aggressively to root 
out entrenched discrimination against children with disabilities.8  The 
                                                          
Perspective on Schaffer v. Weast: Using A Social-Relations Approach to Determine 
the Allocation of the Burden of Proof in Special Education Due Process Hearings, 
12 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL'Y 133, 154 (2008) (“While the intent of IDEA is 
for parents to become partners with school districts in the development of their 
child’s educational program, research has shown that many parents feel denigrated 
in their relationships with school personnel, who are in the positions of power.”); 
Erin Phillips, When Parents Aren’t Enough: External Advocacy in Special 
Education, 117 YALE L.J. 1802, 1833 (2008) (“If the system now requires parents 
to make smart, consumer-like decisions, those without the requisite material, social, 
and cultural capital are at a marked disadvantage in their role as advocates for their 
children.”); Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Parents as Quasi-Therapists Under the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 899, 911 (2008) 
(“[T]he IEP process often involves a tension and conflict between parents who 
naturally want what is best for their child and school districts who are often looking 
at the cost of providing special education services.”); Daniela Caruso, Bargaining 
and Distribution in Special Education, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 171, 172–
73 (2005) (”The current [special education] system yields lower payoffs for needier 
families, which are on average less endowed with bargaining power and therefore 
less capable of taking advantage of participation opportunities.”). 
7 See Marvin Lazerson, The Origins of Special Education, in SPECIAL 
EDUCATION POLICIES 38 (1983) (“It is hard to overestimate the impact of parental 
organizations on special education in the 1950s and 1960s: they were successful 
agitators for the expansion of the system . . . through letter writing campaigns, 
through lobbying pressures in state legislatures and departments of education, and 
through the development of national coordinating groups, they forced the transfer 
of larger portions of educational funds to special education.”). 
8 Id. 
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timing of this development was no accident, as there were important 
points of connection between the movement for disabled children’s 
educational rights and the civil rights movement more generally.  
First, the rhetoric and practice of segregation (familiar from the battle 
over racial equality) was central to the experience of families with 
disabled children.  These parents struggled with policies that had the 
intended effect of keeping “crippled children” away from “normal” 
children by separating them until the former dropped out of school.9  
Second, many of the children deemed by educators to be 
“handicapped” were non-white and/or spoke foreign languages.10  As 
the racial desegregation movement took hold, middle-class white 
parents of disabled children and their allies drew upon the rhetoric 
and leveraged the salience of the fight against racially segregated 
education to “le[ad] the attack on exclusion from the educational 
system.”11  Non-white and non-English speaking parents joined in the 
fight against an education system that was segregating their children 
under the guise of disability.12 
Employing a rights-based approach to desegregation in 
special education, groups representing disabled children took to the 
courts.  In 1972, two watershed education cases were decided, 
thereby bringing the segregation of children with special needs from 
“mainstream” public education into the cultural consciousness and 
into the constitutional rights framework.  First, in Pennsylvania 
Association of Retarded Children (PARC) v. Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania, a federal district court approved a settlement 
agreement in a class action, enjoining Pennsylvania from excluding 
“retarded” children from public education.13  The state had 
previously deemed the relevant class of students “uneducable and 
untrainable.”14  The court found that the plaintiffs had “established a 
colorable constitutional claim,” and that their right to equal 
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment had been violated when 
                                                          
9 Id. at 39. 
10 Id. at 41. 
11 Id. 
12 Lazerson, supra note 7, at 41.  
13 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).  The court noted that an estimated 
70,000–80,000 children between the ages of five and twenty-one were denied 
access to any public education services.  Id. at 296. 
14 Id. at 282. 
 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 32-2 
 
428 
the state denied public education to children deemed “mentally 
retarded” while providing public education to non-impaired 
children.15  In approving the parties’ settlement, the court explained: 
“This is a noble and humanitarian end in which the Commonwealth 
of Pennsylvania has chosen to join.  Today, with the following Order, 
this group of citizens will have new hope in their quest for a life of 
dignity and self-sufficiency.”16 
Just three months later, in Mills v. Board of Education of the 
District of Columbia, a federal district court determined that the 
District of Columbia had violated the due process rights of disabled 
children by excluding them from school without providing any 
educational alternative.17  The court held that the District is obligated 
to provide each school-aged child a “free and suitable publicly-
supported education, regardless of the degree of the child’s . . . 
disability or impairment.”18  The court’s highly detailed order 
regarding the provision of education for children with disabilities laid 
a blueprint for what would later become federal special education 
law, complete with a requirement to identify disabled children in 
need of services, individually tailored education plans, compensatory 
education, and due process rights.19 
These court rulings establishing a right to an education were a 
victory for disabled children, but were insufficient to form the basis 
of a robust system of special education.  Legislative action was 
necessary to place special education on secure footing, chiefly 
because without it, special education programs could not be assured 
of funding.20  The 1975 enactment of the Education for All 
                                                          
15 Id. at 288 n. 19. 
16 Id. at 302. 
17 348 F. Supp. 866, 874–75 (D.D.C. 1972).  Years earlier, the court had 
proclaimed that “the equal protection clause in its application to public school 
education—is in its full sweep a component of due process binding on the District 
under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.”  Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. 
Supp. 401, 493 (D.D.C. 1967). 
18 Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 878. 
19 Id. at 878–83. 
20 Jack Tweedie, The Politics of Legalization in Special Education 
Reform, in SPECIAL EDUCATION POLICIES 48, 54 (1983).  As we will see, even with 
legislative action, access to funding for special education programming remains a 
persistent problem. 
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Handicapped Children Act21—the precursor to the IDEA—promised 
change.  It guaranteed at least some federal funding for special 
education programming in public schools and mandated that disabled 
children receive a free appropriate public education in the least 
restrictive environment;22 that is, children in need of special 
education services were to be integrated into the general education 
system to the maximum extent appropriate. 
 
B.  Developing an IEP 
 
The guarantee of a free appropriate public education (FAPE) 
for eligible students is the cornerstone of special education law.  The 
IDEA defines FAPE as the following: 
  
[S]pecial education and related services that—(A) 
have been provided at public expense, under public 
supervision and direction, and without charge; (B) 
meet the standards of the State educational agency; 
(C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary 
school, or secondary school education in the State 
involved; and (D) are provided in conformity with the 
individualized education program required under 
section 1414(d) of this title.23 
 
As becomes immediately apparent, this is a “definition” in name 
only; it provides no guidance or instruction as to what constitutes an 
“appropriate education.”  It does, however, set up a procedure for the 
provision of FAPE: the requirement of an “individualized education 
program” (IEP).24  The IEP operates like a contract between the 
school district and the student; it is a document created after 
negotiations between two parties (the parents and the school district), 
and the terms written into the IEP are legally enforceable.25  This 
                                                          
21 Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975). 
22 The IDEA is “spending clause” legislation—it offers federal funds to 
states that meet the conditions required for their receipt.  20 U.S.C. § 1412. 
23 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9) (2006). 
24 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d) (2006). 
25 Professor Daniela Caruso unpacks this analogy in her article, 
Bargaining and Distribution in Special Education.  Caruso, supra note 6.  Caruso 
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contract performs several functions: it recognizes the child’s 
eligibility for special education, summarizes the child’s present levels 
of academic achievement and performance, lays out specific and 
measurable educational goals for the student, and lists any services 
and accommodations the school district is to provide.26   
A student’s IEP is created at a meeting of his or her “IEP 
team” and is revised by that team annually.27  By law, this team must 
include a general education teacher, a special education teacher, a 
representative from the school district, and a parent of the child.28  
Often, and depending on the child’s disabilities, other professionals, 
such as speech therapists, social workers, psychologists, and 
occupational therapists are part of the IEP team.29  While the law 
does not mandate parental participation in the IEP process,30 it does 
express a strong preference for parental involvement.  Parents must 
be invited to participate in IEP meetings; school districts are required 
to accommodate parents’ schedules in setting meeting times; and an 
interpreter must be provided in the event that the parent is deaf or not 
a native English speaker.31 
                                                          
makes clear that the similarities between negotiating an IEP and negotiating a 
contract are really only present where empowered (educated, informed, wealthy) 
parents are sitting across the table from the school district.  Id. at 178.  Caruso 
notes that the “consideration” offered by the parents in an IEP contract negotiation 
is the implicit promise not to bring a due process hearing against the district for a 
denial of FAPE.  Id. at 179–80.  Crucially, Caruso notes that parents who are not 
sufficiently empowered to bring a lawsuit—because they do not know they can or 
because they do not have the means to hire an attorney—have less consideration to 
offer and therefore wind up with a less robust IEP.  Id. at 184.  In those instances, 
and because special education services are actually a legal entitlement for eligible 
children, the relationship between disempowered parents and the school district is 
more similar to the relationship between consumers of public benefits and the 
government agency that provides the benefits.  For wealthier parents, however, an 
IEP (in both its development and the final product) maintains the equivalence of a 
contract.  Id. at 176. 
26 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i) (2006). 
27 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(4)(A)(i) (2006). 
28 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B) (2006). 
29 See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B)(vi) (2006). 
30 The public agency must take steps to ensure parent participation in an 
IEP meeting, but is able to conduct an IEP meeting in the absence of a parent.  34 
C.F.R. § 300.322(d) (2012). 
31 34 C.F.R. § 300.322(e) (2012). 
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As the Supreme Court has recognized, the IEP meeting is 
intended to be a “cooperative process . . . between parents and 
schools.”32  This intention is reflected in the statutory scheme in a 
variety of ways.  First, and most obvious, the statute’s use of the term 
“team” signals that the participants should work together and are “on 
the same side”—the side of the disabled student.  Second, and more 
importantly, there are no formal votes in an IEP meeting.  No one 
person or entity bears the burden of persuasion;33 the team is to make 
a group decision on the content of the IEP.34  The goal is for the team 
to discuss the child’s academic and functional achievements and to 
develop an individually tailored plan to help that child succeed.35  
The process of determining what constitutes an appropriate education 
for a given child is meant to be a dynamic one characterized by 
mutual respect and the sharing of information and ideas between 
parent and school.  
Schools hold IEP team meetings every year, often with little 
or no discord.  The team works its way through the district’s IEP 
form—a document created by either the department of education in a 
state or the individual school district36—and crafts an education 
program for the disabled student.  At times, however, the IEP 
collaboration fractures, and parents and school districts find 
themselves in opposition to one another.  When this happens, 
important disparities between parents and school districts emerge, 
and these disparities, working in tandem with legal doctrine, resource 
constraints, and imbalances in parents’ and school districts’ access to 
legal counsel and insurance coverage, have prevented the IDEA from 
                                                          
32 Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 53 (2005) (“The core of the statute . . . 
is the cooperative process that it establishes between parents and schools . . . . [t]he 
central vehicle for this collaboration is the IEP process”).   
33 As I explain below, this ceases to be the case when parents and school 
districts cannot agree on an IEP and formal dispute resolution processes begin.  See 
infra Part III.B.2.  Under those conditions, the party challenging the IEP (typically 
the parent) bears the burden of persuading the hearing officer or the court that the 
existing plan is legally defective.  Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 62. 
34 34 C.F.R. § 300.320 (2012). 
35 Id. 
36 The IEP form is a document that lists all of the elements that are 
required to be written into an IEP (such as specific educational goals for the child, 
the child’s present levels of academic achievement, and the type of services to be 
provided to the child) and provides space for the IEP team to record its decisions. 
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delivering meaningfully on its promise of a free appropriate public 
education.37 
 
III.  SPECIAL EDUCATION IN PRACTICE 
 
In this section, I examine the factors that shape the IEP 
process as it actually operates.  Part III.A focuses on the 
psychological, professional, and personal dynamics of parent-district 
relationships that can undermine the collaborative scheme imagined 
by the IDEA.  Part III.B zeroes in on the FAPE standard and 
examines the legal and economic factors that have made the 
guarantee of a “free appropriate public education” into something 
less than it might have been.  Part III.C, finally, considers the effect 
of legal representation and insurance coverage on special education 
litigation.   
 
A.  The Uneasy Collaboration Between Parents and School 
Districts 
 
Because a child’s IEP team consists almost entirely of school 
district personnel, when parents and school districts disagree 
regarding the services and accommodations a child needs in order to 
receive an appropriate education, parents may be the lone dissenting 
voice on the IEP team.  Depending on the nature of the child’s 
disability, IEP meetings may be attended by as few as three, and 
upwards of ten, representatives of the school district.38  Even when a 
parent brings an advocate39 and/or private experts40 to the meeting, 
the parent is almost always outnumbered. 
                                                          
37 See infra Part III.  To be sure, there are parents who make unreasonable 
demands on school districts, asking for services their children do not need or 
services that are so extravagant that few would assume that a school district would 
be responsible for providing them.  This paper is not about those parents—it is 
about the reasonable, concerned parents who have an idea and an expectation about 
what would constitute an “appropriate” education for their disabled child and who 
butt into the dual reality of a narrow definition of “appropriate” by courts and of 
limited resources available to school districts. 
38 See supra Part II.B. 
39 Special education advocates are professionals, trained in the rules of 
special education, who advise parents in the special education process.  But they 
are not attorneys and cannot represent parents in legal proceedings.  The Counsel of 
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Under ideal circumstances, the parent is regarded by the IEP 
team as an expert on her child.  The parent presumably knows her 
child better than anyone else at the meeting and can, therefore, 
provide important information to the team.  But school districts do 
not always perceive parental input this way.  At times, parents are 
seen by school districts as lacking the emotional distance or 
education needed to meaningfully assist in the process of devising an 
education plan for the child.41  In connection with a study of families 
navigating the special education system in New York, one 
commenter explained: 
 
Often, but not always, parents feel that their own 
observations or requests are given little weight and 
that decisions are based primarily on the 
recommendations of the professionals.  Their own 
close relationship with the child is viewed as a 
liability rather than as an asset—a liability that renders 
their judgments inherently suspect.42   
 
There can be a territorial element at play in these meetings, 
which may manifest itself in deliberate attempts by educators and 
school personnel to exclude parents from meaningful participation in 
developing the IEP.43  Unsurprisingly, there is “strong resentment by 
                                                          
Parent Attorneys and Advocates has written a code of conduct for special education 
advocates, which is available online.  Voluntary Code of Ethics for Special 
Education Advocates, COUNCIL OF PARENT ATTORNEYS AND ADVOCATES, INC. 
(COPAA), http://www.copaa.org/membership/advocates/791-2/. 
40 Parents sometimes bring their child’s doctor or psychologist or other 
professional who has conducted an evaluation with the child to the IEP team 
meeting.  These professionals often have valuable insight into the needs of the 
child. 
41 Martin A. Kotler, The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: A 
Parent’s Perspective and Proposal for Change, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM, 331, 
363 (1994) (citing Roland K. Yoshida et al., Parental Involvement in the Special 
Education Pupil Planning Process: The School's Perspective, 44 EXCEPTIONAL 
CHILDREN 531, 533 (1978)). 
42 David M. Engel, Law, Culture, and Children with Disabilities, 1991 
DUKE L.J. 166, 188 (1991). 
43 In one example, I participated in an IEP meeting in which the parent 
was urging the school district to place her child in a particular school.  The lawyer 
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educators of the parental right and power under the Act to challenge 
the educators’ professional judgment.”44  Where this dynamic is 
present, according to the New York study, “[t]he educators’ response 
has often been to seek consciously to circumvent the principle of 
parental involvement which underlies the Act.”45  
But the problem is not limited to cases involving intentional 
efforts on the part of educators to exclude parents from true 
membership on the IEP team.  Typically, there are significant 
asymmetries in the expertise level of parents and school district 
personnel, and these asymmetries can warp the deliberative process.  
Thus, while parents may have a deep sense of their child’s character, 
of what challenges her, or what makes her happy or sad, they 
typically do not have access to the technical language of psycho-
educational testing and educational interventions.  And this can cause 
parents to be shunted aside during the IEP process as they are 
bombarded with professional terminology in which they are not 
conversant.  (When I began practicing special education law, I had 
the experience of attending IEP meetings and struggling simply to 
assimilate the jargon, let alone contribute in a meaningful way to 
advance my clients’ interests.  To individuals without prior 
experience or training, it can feel as if IEP teams speak a foreign 
language.) 
Courts have taken heed of this asymmetry, but they do not 
tend to give it operative weight when deciding cases.46  The Supreme 
Court’s decision in Schaffer v. Weast is illustrative.47  In Schaffer, the 
Court acknowledged that school districts enjoy a “natural advantage” 
with respect to educational expertise; but the Court insisted that the 
right of parents to access information from school districts, together 
                                                          
for the district responded pointedly: “this is the district’s IEP.”  This sentiment, 
while often present, is not usually made explicit. 
44 Kotler, supra note 41, at 366. 
45 Id. 
46 See, e.g., Oberti v. Bd. of Educ. of Borough of Clementon Sch. Dist., 
995 F.2d 1204, 1219 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting that “[i]n practical terms, the school 
has an advantage when a dispute arises under the Act: the school has better access 
to the relevant information, greater control over the potentially more persuasive 
witnesses (those who have been directly involved in the child’s education), and 
greater overall educational expertise than the parents.”).  See also Engel, supra note 
42, at 189. 
47 546 U.S. 49 (2005). 
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with the IDEA’s procedural safeguards, serve to mitigate parents’ 
corresponding disadvantage.48 
Parents do have significant procedural protections under the 
IDEA.49  For example, in making decisions about placement and 
programming for a disabled child, the IEP team relies on information 
from the child’s most recent evaluations.  School districts are 
obligated to conduct a comprehensive evaluation of a child with a 
disability every three years.50  The district typically conducts its own 
evaluation of the child.  However, if a parent disagrees with the 
results of the school district’s evaluation, that parent has the right to 
request an independent educational evaluation (IEE) at public 
expense.51  An outside evaluation can be an important way for 
parents to challenge the expertise of school districts with independent 
experts of their own.  And, in theory, giving parents access to an 
expert in their child’s disability for free should reduce disparities 
between wealthy and poor parents.  But the Supreme Court’s 
treatment of this right as a counterweight to the expertise52 is 
misplaced.   
                                                          
48 Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 60.  The procedural safeguards include the 
following: the right to request independent evaluations of their child when parents 
disagree with the school’s evaluation, to have access to the schools’ records about 
their child, to participate in meetings, to receive written notice when the district 
proposes to change the child’s placement, and to request a hearing before a neutral 
adjudicator.  See also 20 U.S.C. §1415 (2006) (entitled “Procedural Safeguards”). 
49 20 U.S.C. §1415(a) (2006) (School districts receiving IDEA funds must 
“establish and maintain procedures . . . to ensure that children with disabilities and 
their parents are guaranteed procedural safeguards . . . .”). 
50 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(2) (2006). 
51 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(b)(1) (2012). 
52 Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 60–61 (“IDEA thus ensures parents access to an 
expert who can evaluate all the material that the school must make available, and 
who can give an independent opinion.  They are not left to challenge the 
government without a realistic opportunity to access the necessary evidence, or 
without an expert with the firepower to match the opposition”).  See Elisa Hyman 
et al., How IDEA Fails Families Without Means: Causes and Corrections from the 
Frontlines of Special Education Lawyering, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 
107, 126–27 (2011) (arguing that it is difficult for parents without means to obtain 
independent educational evaluations.  If a school district delays an evaluation or 
challenges the need for an IEE, parents who cannot afford an attorney or an 
independent expert to demonstrate the need for the evaluation will not be able to 
access the right). 
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First, many parents do not know they can request an IEE.  
While school districts must inform parents of this entitlement, they 
typically do so by handing parents a multi-page document entitled 
“procedural safeguards,” and the document can be difficult to 
understand.53  Second, even if parents are aware of their right to 
obtain an independent evaluation at public expense and seek to 
exercise that right, few school districts simply oblige.  Instead, 
districts often move to choose the evaluator themselves or to limit the 
scope of the evaluation in order to control costs.  School districts also 
have the option of initiating a due process hearing to demonstrate the 
soundness of their evaluation of the child and thereby to prevent the 
expenditure of district funds on an IEE.54 
In the best case scenario for parents, they successfully request 
an IEE at public expense; the results of the evaluation are aligned 
with what the parents consider to be educationally appropriate for 
their child; and the IEP team changes course accordingly.  But school 
districts are obligated by law only to consider the results of the IEE; 
they are not required to make changes based on those results.55  This 
is fair enough; the independence of the evaluator is no guarantee of 
the value of her work-product.  Still, the school district’s authority to 
flatly reject the results of the IEE, together with the impediments to 
parents securing an IEE in the first place, suggest that the possibility 
of such an independent evaluation is no cure-all.  It is, at the very 
least, an imperfect counterweight to the discomfiting dynamics in the 
IEP process that can come about as a result of the expertise 
asymmetry between parents and school districts.  This is not to say, 
of course, that the educational expertise of school district 
representatives should be given little credence in the IEP process.  
The point is simply that the combination of defensiveness by the 
school district and uneven expertise in the substance of special 
education can leave parents without meaningful input in the IEP. 
                                                          
53 Julie L. Fitzgerald & Marley W. Watkins, Parents’ Rights in Special 
Education: The Readability of Procedural Safeguards, 72 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 
497, 506 (2006) (finding that only 4% to 8% of contemporary Parents’ Rights 
documents are written at or below the recommended 7th-to-8th grade reading level, 
making the safeguards too difficult for the average person to understand).  
54 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(b)(2) (2012). 
55 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(c)(1) (2012). 
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Parents may also be reluctant to speak out at IEP meetings for 
reasons other than an expertise differential.  They may dislike 
conflict or, knowing that resources are limited, may not want to 
assert the primacy of their child’s needs when other children’s needs 
are also not being met.  This dynamic has been noted by 
commentators regarding the special education process.56  The study 
of special education process in New York, mentioned earlier,57 
revealed that mothers of disabled children sometimes exhibit a 
willingness to subordinate their child’s rights to the interests of the 
district in order to avoid taking a position that might be perceived as 
antagonistic and might harm the family’s long-term relationship with 
the school.58  The fact that a child must continue to attend a school 
even when the school’s teachers and administrators are engaged in 
battle with the child’s parents makes this sort of conflict complicated 
for all parties involved. 
Finally, the difficulties parents face in IEP meetings are 
particularly pronounced when parents and school district personnel 
are separated by language barriers and/or socio-economic or 
educational divides.  Poor parents, uneducated parents, and 
immigrant parents may feel unable to speak up at an IEP meeting and 
advocate for their children.  They may not understand their children’s 
rights under special education law or have the language needed to 
advocate effectively.  Also, these populations are disproportionately 
likely to require special education services for their children.59 
                                                          
56 See, e.g., Engel, supra note 42, at 199 (taking note of parents’ tendency 
to work toward compromise with school districts, even when it means failing to 
fully vindicate their own child’s rights). 
57 See supra Part III.A. 
58 See Engel, supra note 42, at 198–99.  Professor Engel attempts to 
connect this phenomenon to Carol Gilligan’s work relating to gender and moral 
reasoning.  Id. at 195 (discussing CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: 
PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN’S DEVELOPMENT (1982)).  Engel observes 
that it is usually the mother of the child who deals with the school district, and he 
suggests that, in light of Gilligan’s work, we might expect mothers to be reluctant 
to deploy a “rights analysis” in negotiating with a school district over an IEP; 
during the course of Engel’s research, “[t]here were . . . many instances when 
mothers drew back from an assertion of rights”).  Id. at 198. 
59 See Hyman et al., supra note 52, at 112–13 (citing MARY WAGNER ET 
AL., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., THE CHILDREN WE SERVE: THE DEMOGRAPHIC 
CHARACTERISTICS OF ELEMENTARY AND MIDDLE SCHOOL STUDENTS WITH 
DISABILITIES AND THEIR HOUSEHOLDS (2002), available at 
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It is difficult enough for parents to participate fully in the IEP 
process when they have only a limited understanding of special 
education law, are not conversant in the jargon that is so often tossed 
around at team meetings, and are worried about jeopardizing their 
relationship with a school district they must rely on in the long-term 
for the education of their child.  When the dynamics of socio-
economic status and language proficiency are added to the mix, 
parents may be all but silenced.  They “describe themselves as 
terrified and inarticulate [during the IEP meeting].  Some liken 
themselves to prisoners awaiting their sentence, and this courtroom 
imagery emphasizes their perception of the judgmental rather than 
cooperative quality of the decision making as well as their feelings of 
vulnerability and disempowerment.”60  
In these instances, when parents do not have the skills or 
resources to advocate for their children, the IEP team becomes one-
sided.  Despite courts’ repeated assertion that parental participation at 
IEP meetings must be “meaningful,” and not amount to “mere 
form,”61 school districts make the educational decisions for the 
disabled child, and the parents—without knowing the alternatives—
are left with an IEP into which they had very little input.  This may or 
may not be appropriate for their child.62 
                                                          
http://www.seels.net/designdocs/SEELS_Children_We_Serve_Report.pdf (stating 
that one-quarter of the children eligible for special education live below the poverty 
line and two-thirds live in households with incomes of $50,000 or less)).  See also 
Patricia A. Massey and Stephen A. Rosenbaum, Disability Matters: Toward a Law 
School Clinical Model For Serving Youth With Special Education Needs, 11 
CLINICAL L. REV. 271 (2005) (citing a study showing that low-income families are 
50% more likely to have a child with a disability than higher income families, and 
single mothers receiving welfare themselves have a 38% rate of disability); 
Pasachoff, supra note 6, at 1432 (“The wealth disparity in private IDEA 
enforcement is particularly disturbing because children with disabilities are more 
likely to live in poverty than children in the general population are.”). 
60 Engel, supra note 42, at 188.  
61 Deal v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 392 F.3d 840, 858 (6th Cir. 2004) 
(citing W.G. v. Bd. of Trs. of Target Range Sch. Dist. No. 23, 960 F.2d 1479, 1485 
(9th Cir. 1992) and N.L. v. Knox Cnty. Schs. 315 F.3d 688, 694–95 (6th Cir. 
2003)). 
62 Professor Kotler writes, “[p]arents are typically unfamiliar with the 
technical legal standard [of FAPE]. Thus, they assume frequently that when school 
officials assert that a certain program is ‘appropriate’ for a given child, it means the 
‘best’ for that child or at least roughly comparable to programming which can be 
obtained privately.”  Kotler, supra note 41, at 372. 
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B.  The Tension Between “Appropriate” and “Free” 
 
The process of negotiating an IEP that provides a free 
appropriate public education (FAPE) takes place within a legal and 
economic framework that further complicates parents’ efforts to 
secure educational benefits for their children.  As detailed below, the 
federal courts (including the United States Supreme Court) have 
declined to put teeth in the FAPE requirement and have thereby 
permitted school districts to satisfy the IDEA with relatively limited 
effort.  School districts, meanwhile, operating under significant 
budgetary constraints, face pressure to design IEPs with an eye to the 
financial burden of providing special education services. 
 
1.  Defining “Appropriate” 
 
There are, of course, many parents who have the wherewithal 
and confidence to ask that specific services or goals be added to their 
child’s IEP.63  But school districts may resist these requests, and 
when they do, the district will set the terms of the child’s education 
plan—at least as an initial matter—over the objections of the parent.  
The parent may then choose to file for a due process hearing: a legal 
proceeding, initiated by the filing of a complaint before an impartial 
hearing officer.64  Either party may appeal the outcome of the due 
process hearing to a state court or to a United States District Court.65   
These legal proceedings test a parent’s claim that the IEP 
proposed by the school district fails to provide a free appropriate 
public education.  As noted already, the text of the IDEA tells us 
little about what, exactly, constitutes a FAPE,66 and so it is hardly 
surprising that courts have struggled to determine whether and when 
an IEP provides an “appropriate” education for a particular child.  
                                                          
63 See Caruso, supra note 6, at 178–179 (this wherewithal is often 
connected to socio-economic status). 
64 34 CFR § 300.511 (2012). 
65 34 CFR § 300.516 (2012). 
66 See supra text accompanying notes 23–26.  See also Kotler, supra note 
41, at 353 (“The Act's failure to define ‘appropriate’ in educational or substantive 
terms is one of its major failures and one of the leading causes of litigation under 
the Act.”). 
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Moreover, to the extent the cases help to fill in the interpretive 
blanks, they have fashioned the FAPE requirement into something 
rather feeble.  The most significant of these cases is Board of 
Education of Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley, in 
which the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the contention that, 
through the IDEA, Congress ordered school districts to “maximize 
each handicapped child’s potential.”67  The Court took the position 
that an IEP need only provide “some educational benefit upon the 
handicapped child” in order to pass muster under the IDEA.68  The 
Court reasoned that the absence of a substantive definition of FAPE 
in the Act is evidence that Congress was primarily concerned with 
providing access to education for disabled students rather than a 
particular educational outcome.69  Rowley thus establishes a two-part 
inquiry for purposes of determining whether a school is providing 
FAPE.  First, the court must ask whether the district has complied 
with the procedures applicable under the IDEA; and, second, the 
court must determine whether the resulting IEP is “reasonably 
calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits.”70   
In the Rowley case itself, for example, the parents of a deaf 
child requested a qualified sign language interpreter to accompany 
her to all of her academic classes.71  A neutral hearing officer, 
however, had determined that an interpreter was not needed because 
the child was “‘achieving educationally, academically, and socially’ 
without such assistance.”72  The district court insisted that this was 
not the relevant question for purposes of FAPE.  The question, 
                                                          
67 Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 
176, 199 (1982).  In contrast, the State of Michigan’s special education code 
expressly requires the board of a local school district to “provide special education 
programs and services designed to develop the maximum potential of each student 
with a disability.”  MICH. COMP. LAWS § 380.1751(1) (2012).  Despite this 
language, courts applying Michigan law have generally declined to give it teeth.  
See, e.g., Renner v. Bd. of Educ. of Pub. Sch. of Ann Arbor, 185 F.3d 635, 645 (6th 
Cir. 1999) (quoting Brimmer v. Traverse City Area Pub. Sch., 872 F. Supp. 447, 
454 (W.D. Mich. 1994) (“The term ‘maximum potential’ has not been well-defined 
in Michigan law.  Further, the standard may be more precatory than mandatory; it 
does not necessarily require the best education possible”)). 
68 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 200 (emphasis added). 
69 Id. at 193–96. 
70 Id. at 206–07. 
71 Id. at 184. 
72 Id. at 185. 
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according to the court, was not whether the student was “achieving,” 
but whether there was a discrepancy between her achievement and 
her potential.73  The Supreme Court disagreed, installed the “some 
educational benefit” standard, and denied relief.74 
In 1997, fifteen years after Rowley, Congress amended the 
IDEA.75  In so doing, it shifted attention away from educational 
access and toward educational achievement.  The amendments were 
motivated by the sense that, while the IDEA had been successful at 
providing disabled students with access to education, implementation 
was characterized by low standards and limited benefits.76  The 
amendments established a variety of new requirements for school 
districts in developing IEPs, such as including annual, measurable 
goals for a disabled child in each IEP and explicit statements about 
the services and accommodations the child needs to participate in the 
general education curriculum.77  
Congress reauthorized and amended the IDEA again in 2004, 
this time driven by a desire to align the statute with the No Child Left 
Behind Act.78  These amendments included a requirement that special 
education teachers be “highly qualified”,79 increased accountability 
through measureable annual goals that contain summaries of the 
child’s progress and how that progress was measured,80 and that the 
selection of special education and related services be based on peer 
reviewed research to the extent practicable.81   
                                                          
73 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 185–86. 
74 Id. at 210. 
75 Pub. L. No. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37 (1997). 
76 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(3)-(5) (2006).  See also J.L. v. Mercer Island Sch. 
Dist., No. C06-494P, 2006 WL 3628033 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 8, 2006) (discussing 
the 1997 amendments). 
77 34 C.F.R. § 300.347 (1999).  See generally Archive of U.S. Department 
of Education website for the 1997 IDEA amendments, IDEA’97, 
http://www2.ed.gov/offices/OSERS/Policy/IDEA/whatsnew.html (last updated 
Mar. 5, 2003). 
78 Pub. L. No. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2647 (2004).  See also statement by 
President George W. Bush upon signing H.R. 1350, 40 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 
2897 (Dec. 3, 2004). 
79 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(14)(C) (2006). 
80 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(III) (2006). 
81 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(IV) (2006). 
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At least one commentator has insisted that, in light of these 
amendments to the IDEA, courts must revise their understanding of 
what constitutes FAPE and, crucially, abandon the formulation 
provided in Rowley.82  Because the statutory requirements for IEPs 
are now considerably more specific, the argument goes that it is 
appropriate for courts to consider whether school districts comply 
with these requirements, rather than engaging a Rowley-style 
discussion of whether a child will secure “some educational benefit” 
under an IEP.83  The response of courts to these amendments, 
however, has been uneven, and many continue to treat Rowley as the 
operative standard.84   
                                                          
82 See Dixie Snow Huefner, Updating the FAPE Standard Under IDEA, 
37 J.L. & EDUC. 367, 377–78 (2008). 
83 Id. at 378. 
84 The circuits are split and even internally inconsistent in their definition 
of the extent of the educational benefits that an IEP must confer to provide FAPE.  
The First Circuit recently explained that while the Supreme Court in Rowley only 
required that an IEP offer “some educational benefit” to its student, 458 U.S. 176, 
200, IDEA requires “more than a trivial educational benefit.”  D.B. ex rel. 
Elizabeth B. v. Esposito, 675 F.3d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 2012).  The Court stated that an 
IEP must be “reasonably calculated to confer a meaningful educational benefit.”  
Id. (emphasis added).  Four other circuits also use the “meaningful benefit” 
standard by which to judge the adequacy of an IEP.  See, e.g., E.H. v. Bd. of Educ. 
of Shenendehowa Cent. Sch. Dist., 361 F. App’x 156, 160 (2d Cir. 2009); D.S. v. 
Bayonne Bd. of Educ., 602 F.3d. 553, 556–57 (3d Cir. 2010); Ruffin v. Houston 
Indep. Sch. Dist., 459 F. App’x 358, 361 (5th Cir. 2012); Deal v. Hamilton Cnty. 
Dep’t of Educ., 258 F. App’x 863 (6th Cir. 2008). 
The Ninth Circuit, however, distanced itself from its previous use of the 
“meaningful benefit” standard in 2011, rejecting the appellant’s argument that her 
IEP did not provide a “meaningful benefit” by upholding the district court’s 
decision that her IEP provided her “some educational benefit.”  K.S. v. Fremont 
Unified Sch. Dist., 426 F. App’x 536, 538 (9th Cir. 2011).  Since then, the Ninth 
Circuit has given up adjectives altogether, requiring “an educational benefit” or 
“educational benefits” without any substantive qualifier.  K.D. ex rel. C.L. v. Dep’t 
of Educ., Haw., 665 F.3d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 2011); J.W. ex rel. K.K.W. v. 
Governing Bd. of E. Whittier City Sch. Dist., 473 F. App’x 531 (9th Cir. 2012).  
Three other circuits use the “some educational benefit” standard.  See, e.g., Sumter 
Cnty. Sch. Dist. 17 v. Heffernan ex rel. TH, 642 F.3d 478 (4th Cir. 2011); Park Hill 
Sch. Dist. v. Dass, 655 F.3d 762, 765–66 (8th Cir. 2011); Sytsema ex rel. Sytsema 
v. Acad. Sch. Dist. No. 20, 538 F.3d 1306, 1313 (10th Cir. 2008)).  
Recent cases in three other circuits have, like the Ninth Circuit, declined 
to use any adjective to qualify “educational benefits.”  See, e.g., M.B. ex rel. Berns 
v. Hamilton Se. Schs., 668 F.3d 851, 860 (7th Cir. 2011); Sch. Bd. of Lee Cnty., 
Fla. v. M.M. ex rel. M.M., 348 F. App’x 504 (11th Cir. 2009); District of Columbia 
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In J.L. v. Mercer Island School District, for example, a 
federal district court in Washington held that the 1997 amendments 
to the IDEA transformed special education into a more “outcome 
oriented process,” as opposed to one concerned primarily with 
access.85  It went so far as to state that “any citation to pre-1997 case 
law on special education is suspect.”86  The Ninth Circuit, however, 
reversed.  It stated explicitly that while “the district court concluded 
that Congress superseded Rowley in the 1997 Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act amendment . . . [,] [w]e hold that Rowley 
continues to set the free appropriate public education standard.”87 
Case law from the Sixth Circuit is more equivocal.  A 2004 
case provides that “the IDEA requires an IEP to confer a ‘meaningful 
educational benefit’ gauged in relation to the potential of the child at 
issue.”88  Establishing the educational potential of the child as the 
benchmark of a statutorily legitimate IEP carries the possibility of 
transforming special education law.  Under this standard, instead of 
inquiring (as Rowley directs) only whether the IEP carries the 
promise of securing some benefit above a floor defined by the child’s 
current educational achievement, courts would measure an IEP by 
reference to the ceiling marked by the child’s potential.89 
                                                          
v. Doe, 611 F.3d 888 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  The practical difference between the two 
standards may be minimal, as circuits occasionally conflate their terminology.  For 
instance, a recent Third Circuit case cited the Rowley “some benefit” standard and 
then immediately stated that an IEP must provide “meaningful benefit” without 
reconciling the difference.  G.S. v. Cranbury Twp. Bd. of Educ., 450 F. App’x 197, 
201–02 (3d Cir. 2011).  See also Marc C. Weber, Common-Law Interpretation of 
Appropriate Education: The Road Not Taken in Rowley, 41 J.L. & EDUC. 95 
(2012). 
85 J.L. v. Mercer Island Sch. Dist., No. C06-494P, 2006 WL 3628033, at 
*4 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 8, 2006) opinion corrected on reconsideration, No. C06-
494P, 2007 WL 505450 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 10, 2007) and rev'd in part, vacated in 
part, 592 F.3d 938 (9th Cir. 2010). 
86 Id. 
87 J.L. v. Mercer Island Sch. Dist., 592 F.3d 938, 941 (9th Cir. 2010). 
88 Deal v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 392 F.3d 840, 862 (6th Cir. 2004) 
(emphasis added) (citing T.R. ex rel. N.R. v. Kingwood Twp. Bd. of Educ., 205 
F.3d 572, 577 (3d Cir. 2000); Polk v. Cent. Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 
F.2d 171, 182 (3d Cir. 1988); Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E., 172 F.3d 238, 247 
(3d Cir. 1999)). 
89 Deal, 392 F.3d at 862. 
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But a Sixth Circuit decision handed down years before the 
amendments to the IDEA continues to cast a long shadow over 
special education practice in the jurisdiction, and it is far less 
promising for those seeking access to special education services.  In 
the course of rejecting a challenge filed by two parents to their 
child’s IEP, Doe v. Tullahoma City Schools reasoned as follows:   
 
The [IDEA] requires that the Tullahoma schools 
provide the educational equivalent of a serviceable 
Chevrolet to every handicapped student.  Appellant, 
however, demands that the Tullahoma school system 
provide a Cadillac solely for appellant's use . . . . [W]e 
hold that the Board is not required to provide a 
Cadillac, and that the proposed IEP is reasonably 
calculated to provide educational benefits to appellant, 
and is therefore in compliance with the requirements 
of the IDEA.90 
 
Nineteen years later, and despite the amendments to the IDEA 
mentioned above, school districts’ attorneys routinely cite this 
passage to hearing officers and federal judges in an effort to justify 
the denial of benefits to a disabled child, and federal courts continue 
to cite this passage with approval.91  There is a lot of distance 
between a requirement to maximize a disabled child’s potential and a 
requirement simply to provide a disabled child some educational 
benefit.  By choosing to construct the rights-creating language of the 
IDEA closer to the floor of possible options, courts have failed to 
make the promise of a free appropriate public education anywhere 
near as robust as it might be.   
 
2.  The Burden of Persuasion 
 
When a parent turns to the courts in an effort to vindicate his 
understanding of what is educationally appropriate for his child, it is 
                                                          
90 Doe v. Bd. of Educ. of Tullahoma City Schs., 9 F.3d 455, 459–60 (6th 
Cir. 1993). 
91 See, e.g., Z.D. v. Niskayuna Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 1:06–CV–1190, 2009 
WL 1748794, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. June 19, 2009); Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. 
Dist., 411 F. Supp. 2d 722, 732 (N.D. Ohio 2005).  
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the parent who bears the burden of persuasion.  In Schaffer v. Weast, 
the Supreme Court rejected the contention that putting the burden of 
persuasion on school districts would “further IDEA’s purposes”92 and 
stated that “[t]he burden of proof in an administrative hearing 
challenging an IEP is properly placed on the party seeking relief.”93  
In a 6-2 decision,94 the Court noted that it is extremely rare for the 
entire burden of persuasion to rest with defendants at the outset of a 
case and that the default rule—placing the burden on the party 
seeking relief—makes sense, absent any indication from Congress 
that it intended the reverse.95  The Court reasoned that to hold 
otherwise would be tantamount to assuming “that every IEP is 
invalid until the school district demonstrates that it is not.”96  The 
Court asserted that the procedural protections contained in the IDEA 
“ensure that the school bears no unique informational advantage.”97 
In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg stated that “‘policy 
considerations, convenience, and fairness’ call for assigning the 
burden of proof to the school district . . .” and lamented that the 
majority’s decision places parents at a further disadvantage vis-à-vis 
school districts.98  Justice Ginsburg argued that because the 
development of education programs lies at the core of school 
districts’ affirmative obligation and professional competence, it is 
easier for them to demonstrate the adequacy of an IEP than it is for 
parents to demonstrate its inadequacy.99  According to Ginsburg, “the 
proponent of the IEP . . . is properly called upon to demonstrate its 
adequacy.”100 
                                                          
92 Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 58 (2005). 
93 Id. at 62. 
94 Justice Roberts did not participate, Justice Stevens concurred, and 
Justices Ginsburg and Breyer dissented. 
95 Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 57–58. 
96 Id. at 59. 
97 Id. at 59–61. 
98 Id. at 63. 
99 Id. at 64 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Weast v. Schaffer, 377 F.3d 
449, 458 (4th Cir. 2004) (Luttig, J., dissenting)). 
100 Id.  The National Council on Disability published a Position Statement 
on August 9, 2005 and argued exactly that 
 
[p]lacing the burden of proof on parents, and not on school 
district (sic), to prove inadequacy poses significant roadblocks to 
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Given the expertise and information asymmetries between 
parents and school districts – despite the safeguards of the IDEA – 
Justice Ginsburg’s assessment that this decision makes it easier for 
districts to provide disabled children the bare minimum in services, 
without consequence, rings true.  And there is no doubt that this 
decision has a disproportionate effect on indigent families, who 
cannot afford to hire their own attorneys or experts to help meet the 
burden and who are less likely than wealthier parents to access 
independent educational evaluations.101  
The Schaffer majority relies on the text of the IDEA as 
assurance that parents will be able to work together with school 
districts and that parents are protected in the process.  Justice 
Ginsburg, however, is a realist.  While a simple read of the IDEA is 
enough to inspire hope for collaboration with the school district 
toward a positive educational outcome, the IDEA’s promises are not 
as hardy as they sound.  And finally, as one commentator has urged, 
if parents are unaware of the array of educational options—because 
they have never been presented with these options—they are simply 
not in a position to assess the quality of an IEP.102 
 
                                                          
students with disabilities to obtain appropriate educational 
services.  It is school districts—not parents and children with 
disabilities—that have the advantage in terms of information and 
resources.  It is school districts—not parents and children with 
disabilities—that are in a much better position to prove that an 
IEP is adequate than parents to prove that an IEP is not adequate. 
 
NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT 
BURDEN OF PROOF: ON PARENTS OR SCHOOLS? 4 (August 9, 2005).  
101 See Hyman et al., supra note 52, at 144; Samuel R. Bagenstos, The 
Judiciary’s Now-Limited Role in Special Education, in FROM SCHOOLHOUSE TO 
COURTHOUSE: THE JUDICIARY’S ROLE IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 125 (Joshua M. 
Dunn & Martin R. West eds., 2009) (“Because an IEP is presumably supported by 
the school district’s expertise, a parent can typically succeed in challenging that 
IEP only by offering expert testimony.  But if parents must pay out of pocket for 
expert witnesses, they will be less likely to be able to secure the services of these 
witnesses.  At least at the margins, these decisions [Schaffer and Arlington] are part 
of a ‘pro-school’ trend that further supports the deference that Rowley accords.”).  
102 Kotler, supra note 41, at 371. 
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3.  The Problem of “Free” 
 
Looming over the question of what constitutes an 
“appropriate” education is a basic fact about the provision of special 
education services: it can be extremely expensive, and there is not 
enough money to go around.  Some disabled children require one-on-
one nurses while in school; others need specialized transportation to 
and from school; and some need residential educational facilities.  
None of these services come cheap.  Unsurprisingly, then, financial 
considerations provide a constant backdrop to battles over what 
constitutes FAPE for a particular child.103  Schools have limited 
resources; and, while courts do not expect them to ignore costs in 
developing educational programming,104 there are times when the 
provision of FAPE will be expensive.  There is ample reason that 
school districts permit cost concerns to dominate the IEP process, 
overwhelming the question of what, ultimately, is appropriate for the 
child.105  And where there are finite resources, these resources will be 
allocated to those who advocate most forcefully for them, i.e., to the 
children whose parents have the wherewithal and financial means to 
enforce their children’s due process rights.106    
Indeed, it seems likely that the specter of school districts 
across the country dealing with crushing special education costs has 
contributed in no small part to courts’ reluctance to construe the 
rights provided by the IDEA expansively.  The population of students 
                                                          
103 See Deal v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 392 F.3d 840, 864–65 (6th 
Cir. 2004) (“Left to its own devices, a school system is likely to choose the 
educational option that will help it balance its budget, even if the end result of the 
system’s indifference to the child’s individual potential is a greater expense to 
society as a whole.”).  
104 See, e.g., Clevenger v. Oak Ridge Sch. Bd., 744 F.2d 514, 517 (6th Cir. 
1984) (“Our decisions . . . recognize that cost can be a legitimate consideration 
when devising an appropriate program for individual students.  Nevertheless, cost 
considerations are only relevant when choosing between several options, all of 
which offer an ‘appropriate’ education.”). 
105 See Kotler, supra note 41, at 368 (“Costs are a major consideration—
sometimes the primary consideration—for the educational agency.  In fact, 
agencies knowingly may jeopardize a child’s future well-being by providing 
inappropriate programming which is less expensive in the short term, even though 
quite costly in the long term.”). 
106 See generally Caruso, supra note 6; Pasachoff, supra note 6; supra 
note 25 and accompanying text. 
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receiving special education under the IDEA has grown at nearly 
twice the rate of the general education population. Between 1980 and 
2005, the IDEA population increased by 37%, while the general 
education population increased by only 20%.107  Congress, 
meanwhile, has not done enough to help.  Congress’s first major 
intervention into special education policy was accompanied by a 
pledge to provide up to 40% of the excess cost of educating children 
with disabilities.108  But funding has never reached even half that 
amount.  Funding under the IDEA hovers around 17% of these costs, 
and states and local school districts are left to bridge the gap.109   
According to the National Educational Association, the cost 
to educate a general education student is $7,552 per year.110  The 
average cost to educate a special education student is an additional 
$9,369 per student, or $16,921 in total.111  Especially during times of 
economic recession, with tax revenues in school districts falling 
throughout the country,112 resource-deprived school districts are left 
shouldering a large burden and special education programming 
                                                          
107 Federal Education Budget Project, NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION (Mar. 
26, 2012), http://febp.newamerica.net/background-analysis/individuals-disabilities-
education-act-cost-impact-local-school-districts. 
108 20 U.S.C. § 1411(a) (2006); see also Cory Weinberg, Congress 
Unlikely to Fully Fund IDEA Act, POLITIFACT, http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-
meter/promises/obameter/promise/89/fully-fund-the-individuals-with-disabilities-
educa/ (last updated Dec. 14, 2011). 
109 Special Education Funding Languishes Under Democrat Spending 
Plan, EDUCATION & THE WORKFORCE COMMITTEE (July 24, 2009), 
http://edworkforce.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=172910; 
Terry Jean Seligmann, Sliding Doors: The Rowley Decision, Interpretation of 
Special Education Law, and What Might Have Been, 41 J.L. & EDUC. 71, 87 
(2012). 
110 Background of Special Education and the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act, NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION (2004), 
http://www.nea.org/home/19029.htm; Kathy A. Gambrell, Debate Over Special Ed 
Funding, Meaning, UPI NEWS (Dec. 22, 2003), 
http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2003/12/22/Debate-over-
special-ed-funding-meaning/UPI-13151072115845/. 
111 Supra note 110. 
112 Nicholas Johnson et al., An Update on State Budget Cuts, CTR. ON 
BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Feb. 09, 2011), 
http://www.cbpp.org/cms/?fa=view&id=1214.  Michigan cut its Fiscal Year 2010 
school aid budget by $382 million, resulting in a $165 per-pupil spending 
reduction.  Id. 
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suffers.  Were Congress to allocate more money to special 
education—instead of simply requiring that school districts educate 
disabled children at no cost to parents—school districts would be 
better positioned to work collaboratively with parents in setting up 
education programs and would be able to provide more generous 
services.113 
 
C.  Resource Disparities 
 
The dynamics addressed thus far—relating to the tensions in 
the IEP process, the courts’ permissive construction of FAPE, and 
school districts’ tight budgets—undermine the IEP process itself and 
ultimately limit the benefits available to children in need of special 
education.  The realities of formal dispute resolution in this context 
only exacerbate these tendencies.  
 
1.  Access to Attorneys 
 
As noted already,114 the IDEA anticipates that school districts 
and parents will occasionally disagree, and allows parents to initiate a 
due process hearing (before a neutral hearing officer) to challenge the 
content of an IEP or the procedures through which it was crafted.115  
                                                          
113 This is not to say that all school districts spend what limited money 
they have wisely.  I have heard many parents of disabled children complain about 
money used to build sports facilities rather than to educate disabled children.  I 
have also seen lawyers for school districts drive fancy cars! 
114 See supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text. 
115 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(A) (2006).  School districts are also permitted 
to file due process hearing requests against parents.  Id.  As a matter of practice, 
however, most requests for hearings are filed by parents.  See Schaffer v. Weast, 
546 U.S. 49, 53–54 (2005).  As an alternative to the due process hearing, parents 
may file a complaint against a school district before the State Department of 
Education.  34 C.F.R. § 300.151–.153 (2012).  Historically, complaints filed 
through this process have focused on discrete violations of law: for example, 
whether a school is following a child’s IEP or adhering to the timeline for 
identifying a child with a disability and developing an IEP for that child.  These 
complaints contain a written assertion of a violation of the law and propose a 
resolution to the alleged problem.  34 C.F.R. § 300.153 (2012).  The Department of 
Education then investigates the complaint and makes a recommendation to the 
school district.  34 C.F.R. § 300.152 (2012).  The 1997 Amendments to the IDEA 
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These hearings can be complicated for parents to navigate and 
difficult for them to afford.116   
Due process hearings are court proceedings in almost every 
relevant sense.  At a minimum, a parent who wishes to proceed to a 
hearing must comply with the IDEA’s pleading requirements.117  
Once a due process hearing has been successfully filed and the 
complaint served, a parent will need to assemble and offer 
appropriate exhibits, including relevant medical records and school 
records such as past IEPs, report cards, and evaluation reports.  The 
parent will need to understand the law, which is likely to include both 
federal and state special education statutes as well as relevant case 
law, and they must be able to apply the law to the particular facts of 
their case.  Finally, the parent must be prepared to present witnesses 
who can testify to the child’s needs, including witnesses with 
expertise relating to the child’s disability.   
As discussed above, in a special education due process case, it 
is the parent who bears the burden of persuasion.  Of course, a parent 
may choose to hire an attorney to help her through the litigation 
process, but a special education hearing can cost tens of thousands of 
dollars in legal fees.118  Even if a parent proceeds pro se,119 she can 
                                                          
added free, voluntary mediation as a possible method of dispute resolution.  20 
U.S.C. § 1415(e)(1) (2006). 
116 To get a general sense of the cost of a due process hearing, the 
Oklahoma Insurance Group covered school districts up to $25,000 per hearing.  
Solutions and Coverage, OKLA. SCHS. INS. GROUP, 
http://www.osig.org/content.htm?page=solutions.htm.  In Schaffer, the Supreme 
Court noted that due process hearing typically cost school districts $8,000 to 
$12,000.  546 U.S. at 59 (citing JAY G. CHAMBERS ET AL., WHAT ARE WE 
SPENDING ON PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS IN SPECIAL EDUCATION, 1999-2000? 8 
(Jean Wolman & Jamie Shkolnik eds., 2003), available at http://www.csef-
air.org/publications/seep/national/Procedural%20Safeguards.pdf).  A special 
education mediation brochure published by the Michigan Department of Education 
lists due process hearings as costing upwards of $50,000.  MICH. SPECIAL EDUC. 
MEDIATION PROGRAM, FACILITATION AND MEDIATION (Feb. 2010), available at 
http://msemp.cenmi.org/sites/default/files/Facilitation_Mediation.pdf. 
117 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(7)(A) (2006). 
118 For particularly egregious examples of the expense of due process 
litigation, see generally Atlanta Law Firm Charges to County Schools Top $1.7 
Million, THE CHATTANOOGAN (Mar. 14, 2005), 
http://www.chattanoogan.com/2005/3/14/63675/Atlanta-Law-Firm-Charges-To-
County.aspx; Kari Andren, School Districts Spend Thousands on Litigation Over 
Special Education, THE PATRIOT NEWS (Jan. 27, 2010), 
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expect to incur substantial expenses in the form of expert witnesses 
(whose fees she cannot recover, even if she wins) and lost wages as a 
result of work missed in order to prepare for and attend the 
hearing.120  
It should come as no surprise that having an attorney is 
strongly correlated with successful outcomes at trial.121  Wealthier 
parents, who have the means to obtain legal representation, are 
therefore more likely to sue school districts in the first instance122 and 
are more likely to successfully vindicate their children’s educational 
rights.123  For lower-income families, who comprise the bulk of 
special education recipients,124 it is far more difficult to secure legal 
representation.125  
The difficulty in securing counsel is exacerbated by the fact 
that the IDEA does not provide damages to a prevailing party in a 
                                                          
http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2010/01/school_districts_spend_thous
an.html.  See also supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
119 The right of a parent to bring suit under the IDEA without an attorney 
in a due process hearing was established in 2007.  See Winkelman v. Parma City 
Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516 (2007) (holding that parents have substantive rights at 
stake in special education and are, therefore, representing themselves in a due 
process hearing as opposed to practicing law without a license). 
120 The IDEA permits prevailing parents to recoup attorneys’ fees, 20 
U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) (2006), but not expert witness fees, Arlington Central 
School District Board of Education v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 323 (2006).  Even 
with the promise of fee-shifting in the event of successful litigation, the prospect of 
paying out of pocket as litigation proceeds is prohibitive in many cases.  
Legislation has been proposed to allow parents to recoup expert witness fees.  See 
IDEA Fairness Restoration Act, S. 613, 112th Cong. (2011). 
121 Hyman et al., supra note 52, at 141. 
122 Pasachoff, supra note 6, at 1426–27 (discussing the federally funded 
national study, JAY G. CHAMBERS ET AL., WHAT ARE WE SPENDING ON 
PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS IN SPECIAL EDUCATION, 1999-2000? 8 (Jean Wolman 
& Jamie Shkolnik eds., 2003), available at 
http://www.csef-air.org/publications/seep/national/Procedural%20Safeguards.pdf). 
123 Pasachoff, supra note 6, at 1426–27 (reviewing various studies that 
have found as much to be true). 
124 See Hyman et al., supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
125 See generally LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP 
IN AMERICA: THE CURRENT UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME 
AMERICANS (2009), available at http://www.lsc.gov/justicegap.pdf (stating that 
only a small fraction of legal problems experienced by low-income people (less 
than one in five) are addressed with the assistance of either a private attorney (pro 
bono or paid) or a legal aid lawyer). 
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due process hearing.  Parents are entitled to reasonable attorneys’ 
fees if they prevail (though not if they reach a private settlement126), 
but attorneys’ fees alone are not a sufficient incentive for private 
attorneys to take on special education cases.  Without the possibility 
of a damages award, private attorneys are reluctant to take on the 
risks of this type of litigation.127  A further barrier to obtaining legal 
representation is the risk of being assessed the school districts’ 
attorneys’ fees should the parents’ claim be found to be “frivolous, 
unreasonable, or without foundation.”128 
A small minority of low-income parents may be able to 
secure free legal representation from a local legal aid office, their 
state’s Protection and Advocacy organization,129 or a law school 
clinical program that handles special education cases.130  But there 
are very few legal aid offices that handle special education cases,131 
                                                          
126 Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dept. of Health & 
Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 600 (2001) (requiring a “judicial imprimatur” to be 
deemed a “prevailing party”); John T. ex rel. Paul T. v. Del. Cnty. Intermediate 
Unit, 318 F.3d 545, 556–57 (3d Cir. 2003) (explicitly applying Buckhannon to 
cases arising under the IDEA). 
127 Pasachoff, supra note 6, at 1453 (citing Michael Selmi, Public vs. 
Private Enforcement of Civil Rights: The Case of Housing and Employment, 45 
UCLA L. REV. 1401, 1458–59 (1998)).  There are actually very few private 
attorneys who even take special education cases in which they represent parents.  
The Council of Parent Attorneys and Advocates (COPAA) website lists only five 
attorneys in the State of Michigan who represent parents in special education 
proceedings.  Find and Attorney / Advocate, COPAA, http://www.copaa.org/find-a-
resource/find-an-attorney/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2013).  
128 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i) (2006). 
129 Congress has mandated that every state have a Protection and 
Advocacy (P&A) organization to provide legal services, education, and advocacy 
to people with disabilities.  See generally NAT’L DISABILITY RTS. NETWORK, 
http://www.napas.org. 
130 Patricia A. Massey & Stephen A. Rosenbaum, Disability Matters: 
Toward a Law School Clinical Model for Serving Youth with Special Education 
Needs, 11 CLINICAL L. REV. 271, 285 (2005) (urging the development of law 
school clinics that focus on special education law to address the dearth of this type 
of representation for low-income parents and to provide students with valuable 
legal training). 
131 Special education litigation does not fall under restricted Legal 
Services Corporation (LSC) categories.  Yet, few offices handle these cases.  In 
2010, LSC closed 932,406 cases.  Of these, 0.7% (6,978) were education cases, and 
0.2% (1,916) were special education cases.  See LEGAL SERVS. CORP., LEGAL 
SERVICES CORPORATION 2010 FACT BOOK 17-24 (2011), available at 
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and there are also few of these clinics throughout the country.132  As 
a result, many parents have no choice but to represent themselves—a 
prospect which is particularly daunting for those parents who 
themselves have only minimal education.133  
School districts, in contrast, are rarely in the position of 
navigating special education litigation on their own; they typically 
contract with a law firm or lawyer that specializes in education law.  
This arrangement pays off: nationally, school districts win roughly 
sixty-five percent of special education lawsuits.134  The expense of a 
due process hearing as well as barriers to access to legal 
                                                          
http://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/LSC/pdfs/LSC_2010_Fact_Book.pdf.  See 
also Lauren Roth, Florida Parents Seek Help from Special-Education Advocates, 
ORLANDO SENTINEL (Jan. 2, 2012), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2012-01-
02/business/os-florida-special-education-advocacy-20111225_1_special-education-
advocates-special-education-individualized-education-program. 
132 There are very few law school clinics that handle special education 
cases, and even fewer exclusively devoted to education cases.  The 2010 Center for 
the Study of Applied Legal Education survey, which had an 84% response rate, 
asked clinicians to identify the type of clinic in which they teach; not one clinic 
identified itself as an “education law clinic.”  Of the respondents, however, 4.6% 
identified their clinics as “Children in the Law” clinics.  Presumably some of these 
clinics handle special education cases.  See CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF APPLIED 
LEGAL EDUC., 2010-11 CSALE SURVEY OF APPLIED LEGAL EDUCATION (May 16, 
2012), available at http://www.csale.org/files/CSALE.Report.on.2010-
11.Survey.5.16.12.Revised.pdf.  The Wrightslaw website, which is a special 
education resource for parents, attorneys, and advocates, identifies fifteen law 
school clinics in the country that handle special education cases.  See So You Want 
to Go to Law School?, WRIGHTSLAW, 
http://www.wrightslaw.com/lawschool/index.htm.  
133 Massey, supra note 130, at 281 (“[O]ne-third of special education 
parents are low-income, and one-third of the mothers of children with disabilities 
have not completed high school.”); see also Elisa Hyman et al., How IDEA Fails 
Families Without Means: Causes and Corrections from the Frontlines of Special 
Education Lawyering, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 107, 112–13 (2011) 
(“Of all the disabled children eligible for special education services under the 
IDEA, one-quarter (approximately 2 million) live below the poverty line and two-
thirds (approximately 4.5 million) live in households with incomes of $50,000 or 
less.”); Phillips, supra note 6, at 1836 (“Evidence suggests that during the 1980s 
and 1990s, the prevalence of disability in the United States increased, but only 
among families living below the poverty line.”).  
134 Christina Samuels, Special Education Court Decisions on the Rise, 
EDUCATION WEEK (Jan. 28, 2011, 9:24 AM), 
http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/speced/2011/01/special_education_court_decisi.ht
ml. 
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representation creates further parent-school district asymmetry and 
makes it still more difficult for low-income families to enforce the 
rights conferred by the IDEA.135  
 
2.  Access to Insurance 
 
The expense of litigating a special education case is not borne 
exclusively by the parents: school districts also bear financial 
hardship when they go to a due process hearing.  It is the prospect of 
this financial hardship that gives parents leverage when negotiating a 
child’s IEP with the school district.  School districts must pay for 
both their attorneys and experts, and bear certain costs incidental to 
the hearing, such as paying the court reporter and hiring substitute 
teachers while other teachers testify.  Moreover, if a parent prevails, 
the school district must pay the parent’s attorneys’ fees.136  Parents 
with the financial means to hire—or the good fortune to have 
obtained free—legal counsel should therefore have decent bargaining 
power against a school district,137 unless, of course, the school 
district has insurance that covers the costs of defending a due process 
hearing.  If a school district has such insurance, it significantly alters 
the risk-reward analysis of going to a hearing. 
Let us take a step back: insurance coverage for school 
districts is common and not restricted to the special education 
context.  School districts operate in a highly regulated environment 
and are accustomed to integrating the demands of the legal system 
into daily operations.138  Because school districts may be faced with 
                                                          
135 The dearth of special education due process filings nationally, and 
significantly fewer cases of judicial review of the administrative decisions, lends 
support to the claim that the procedural safeguards of the IDEA are insufficient for 
low-income families.  See generally Bagenstos, supra note 101, at 126–29. 
136 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) (2006). 
137 Caruso, supra note 6; Thomas Hehir, Looking Forward: Toward a New 
Role in Promoting Educational Equity for Students with Disabilities from Low-
Income Backgrounds, in HANDBOOK OF EDUCATION POLICY RESEARCH 836 (Gary 
Sykes et al. eds., 2009) (noting that “[r]esearch on the implementation of due 
process has shown that school administrators are quite attentive to parents who file, 
or even threaten to file for due process hearings.  Directors often change programs 
in order to avoid these contentious, and often expensive, adversarial proceedings.”). 
138 Suzanne Painter, School District Employment Practices Regarding 
School Attorneys, 27 J.L. & EDUC. 73 (1998) (studying the relationship between 
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employment claims or negligence claims, many purchase liability 
insurance.  But, while it is typical for school districts to be insured 
against liability generally, it is a recent—and uncommon—
phenomenon for such coverage to extend to the defense of special 
education proceedings.139 
In Michigan, for example, roughly eighty percent of school 
districts purchase insurance from the Michigan Association of School 
Boards (MASB).140  The MASB created a property/casualty pool in 
1985 for districts that belong to MASB; and, according to MASB, it 
is the nation's largest property/casualty pool serving school districts 
exclusively.141  Beginning in late 2007, MASB added coverage for 
                                                          
school districts and attorneys in Arizona); see also Sarah E. Redfield, The 
Convergence of Education and Law: A New Class of Educators and Lawyers, 36 
IND. L. REV. 609, 618–19 (2003) (discussing the explosion of laws that affect 
education since Brown v. Board of Education was decided and calling for better 
informed educators and lawyers to deal with this new reality) (“[I]t is increasingly 
the case that neither lawyers nor educators can do their work independently.”); 
Perry A. Zirkel, Paralyzing Fear: Avoiding Distorted Assessments of the Effect of 
Law on Education, 35 J.L. & EDUC. 461 (2006) (challenging the perception that 
educators are overwhelmed with litigation but noting the importance of increased 
collaboration between lawyers and educators to create a preventative law 
approach). 
139 In 2010, at my request, the University of Michigan Law School library 
staff did an online search for insurance companies throughout the country that 
provide special education coverage to school districts.  Of the thirty-five insurance 
companies surveyed, only five indicate that they provide coverage for special 
education litigation.  E-mail from Kincaid C. Brown, Head of Electronic and 
Systems Services, University of Michigan Law Library, to author (August 5, 2010) 
(on file with the author.)  For example, the Southwest Washington Risk 
Management Insurance Cooperative in the state of Washington provides coverage 
of $35,000 per special education hearing and $200,000 for the all lawsuits in the 
coverage period.  EDUC. SERV. DIST. 112, RISK MANAGEMENT MATTERS (2012), 
available at http://web3.esd112.org/docs/risk-management-
matters/riskmgmtmatters_fall_2012.pdf?sfvrsn=0.  The Oklahoma School 
Insurance Group provides $25,000 coverage per special education hearing.  
Solutions and Coverage, OKLA. SCH. INS. GROUP, 
http://www.osig.org/content.htm?page=solutions.htm. Perhaps unsurprisingly, I 
could not persuade representatives from any of the insurance companies to answer 
my specific questions as to how the special education litigation coverage works. 
140 See MICH. ASS’N OF SCH. BDS., http://www.masb.org. 
141 The property/casualty pool had 465 member districts for the fiscal year 
ending June 30, 2011.  MASB-SEG Property/Casualty Pool, SETSEG, 
https://www.setseg.org/Content/PropertyCasualty/tabid/116/Default.aspx. 
 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 32-2 
 
456 
allegations of wrongful acts arising from the provision of special 
education under the IDEA.142  This means that, for example, if a 
parent requests a due process hearing for a FAPE violation, the 
school district’s insurance will cover the costs of its defense.  
MASB’s policy provides a $100,000 annual aggregate limit per 
member to defend a special education hearing request.143   
Ordinarily, when a party seeks to purchase insurance, the 
insurer conducts an assessment to make sure the party is insurable, to 
assess the risk that the potential insured will incur a covered loss, to 
determine the extent of coverage, and to calculate premiums.  What 
is unique about the special education coverage provided under the 
MASB policy is that it was provided, at least as an initial matter, with 
no character or risk assessment.144  That is, MASB announced that it 
was adding special education coverage to extant policies at no 
additional cost to those insured and without regard to individual 
districts’ record of IDEA compliance.145  While the coverage is 
incomplete—it does not cover districts’ liability for prevailing 
parents’ attorneys’ fees, nor does it cover the costs of supplying any 
special education services mandated by the court—it does pay for the 
attorneys to defend the school district against this potential loss, 
which can cost tens of thousands of dollars per hearing.146 
The availability of this insurance gives rise to a moral hazard 
problem, because it allows school districts to avoid internalizing all 
of the costs of litigation under the IDEA.  A school district might 
refuse to provide an expensive benefit to a disabled child, knowing 
that it can incur up to $100,000 in legal fees at no marginal cost.147  
                                                          
142  MASB Headlines, MICH. ASS’N OF SCH. BOARDS (August 20, 2007), 
www.masb.org.  For more on the reasons that the special education due process 
hearing defense coverage was added to the insurance pool, see podcast on the 
SETSEG site Special Education Due Process Defense Coverage, SETSEG, 
https://www.setseg.org/Content/SetSegMainPage/PodcastsVideos/tabid/366/Defaul
t.aspx.  According to the podcast, members must use one of three law firms on the 
“counsel panel.”  The chosen firms specialize in education cases. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
146 See id.  See also supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
147 Presumably, a district that incurred significant litigation costs in special 
education cases would expect to see its premiums go up.  But given MASB’s 
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This is not to say that school districts necessarily end up litigating 
more because they have insurance.  The point is simply that districts 
are able to negotiate more aggressively because they need not worry 
about the costs of a hearing.  (Parents, of course, are rarely in this 
position.)  School districts are freer to define FAPE narrowly and to 
write limited IEPs knowing—for the reasons mentioned in Part 
III.A—that they may never have to face a formal legal challenge and 
that, if they do, they carry insurance against the costs of litigating.  In 
short, the liability insurance that companies such as MASB provide 
expands the bargaining power of the school district vis-à-vis an 
already disadvantaged opponent. 
There is, finally, an important collateral consequence of 
school districts’ access to this insurance.  It is corrosive of the 
collaborative process that is supposed to take place between parents 
and schools in the course of creating an IEP.  It is difficult to imagine 
genuine collaboration taking place between parties with vastly 
different levels of bargaining power.  When members of a school 
district sit down to draft an IEP in partnership with parents, if the 
district has insurance to cover some of the costs of a breakdown in 
the collaboration, the district has less to lose than the parents from a 
breakdown.  And this unspoken reality, in turn, affects the ways in 
which the district treats the process. 
 
IV.  SUGGESTIONS FOR CHANGE 
 
Scholars and practitioners have recognized the tendency of 
the legal process of special education to place parents and school 
districts in the role of adversaries instead of focusing on the needs of 
individual children.148  One commentator believes that the solution to 
this problem lies in better training for educators in their legal 
obligations, and in training lawyers to work in the education context 
(with an emphasis on their negotiation and mediation skills rather 
than litigation skills).149  Another argues that the only way to reduce 
the expertise differential between parents and school districts is to 
require school districts to present parents with the complete array of 
                                                          
decision simply to add special education coverage to existing policies, at no 
apparent additional cost, even this is open to question. 
148 Redfield, supra note 138, at 640. 
149 Id. at 641. 
 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 32-2 
 
458 
programming options to give parents a sense of the range of 
possibilities for their child.150  Two other commentators would like to 
codify in the IDEA the appointment of advocates for families as part 
of the child’s IEP team,151 and another believes that increased class 
action litigation is warranted so that benefits awarded to children 
under the IDEA have broader application.152  
Professor Eloise Pasachoff presents a compelling argument 
regarding the limits of the IDEA’s reliance on private enforcement 
for the realization of children’s special education rights, given the 
gross disparities between parents and school districts.  Pasachoff calls 
for increased public enforcement and describes various ways this can 
be done, such as: (1) creating a unified database that collects and 
disseminates information regarding the demographics of students in 
special education, the needs of the students, and the 
services/placements offered to meet those needs (though with 
sensitivity to privacy concerns) to boost transparency;153 (2) initiating 
state investigation and monitoring of FAPE provision to low-income 
students, which would serve the purpose of reducing disparities 
among wealthy children and poor children within a state;154 and (3) 
offering financial incentives to states to take steps to ensure that poor 
children are receiving special education services that are comparable 
to their wealthier peers.155  
Professor Pasachoff’s proposals are innovative, and would 
undoubtedly be helpful to low-income parents.  In my experience 
representing parents in the special education process, public 
enforcement as well as expanded access to attorneys for parents is 
desperately needed.  Parents and school districts often have 
significant trouble communicating and relating.  It is clear from the 
tone of IEP meetings that schools frequently see parents as too 
emotionally involved to understand their child’s educational needs 
and therefore experience these parents as unreasonable, while parents 
                                                          
150 Kotler, supra note 41, at 374–75. 
151 Phillips, supra note 6, at 1837–38; Margaret M. Wakelin, Challenging 
Disparities in Special Education: Moving Parents from Disempowered Team 
Members to Ardent Advocates, 3 Nw. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 263, 284 (2008). 
152 Hehir, supra note 137, at 831. 
153 Pasachoff, supra note 6, at 1465–72. 
154 Id. at 1473–85. 
155 Id. at 1485–88. 
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can barely understand what schools are saying to them.  This 
dynamic, coupled with disparities in bargaining power, undermines 
the IDEA’s purpose and design.  Expanded and enhanced public 
enforcement of the IDEA would mitigate many of these problems.  
And Professor Pasachoff’s proposals—especially the monitoring of 
the provision of FAPE to low-income students—would take some of 
the pressure off these individual parent-school district encounters.  
Additionally, given the growing availability of insurance to 
school districts to cover the costs of due process hearings, private 
enforcement of IDEA’s guarantees is less attainable than even 
Professor Pasachoff realizes.  What is interesting and potentially 
significant here is that insurance for districts threatens relatively 
wealthy parents who, under normal circumstances, would be able to 
enforce their due process rights.  Most middle-class families cannot 
out-spend a school district’s $100,000 litigation budget.  The effect 
of special education litigation insurance coverage on well-resourced 
parents may actually help mobilize these parents to push for 
increased public enforcement of the IDEA.  As became clear in the 
1960s and ‘70s, the mobilization of middle-class and upper-middle-
class parents can result in considerable change.156  
In concert with greater public enforcement of the IDEA, is the 
need to improve parents’ bargaining power against school districts by 
providing increased access to attorneys.  This access can come from 
more legal services agencies taking special education cases, from 
medical-legal partnerships,157 which are an expanding presence in the 
country, and from law school clinics.  There is also (and always) a 
uniform cry for Congress to allocate additional money to special 
                                                          
156 See supra Part II.A. 
157 Medical-legal partnerships integrate attorneys into a person’s 
healthcare team to achieve improved health outcomes.  For example, a child with 
asthma needs an asthma medical plan, but also needs her landlord to remove mold 
from her apartment.  So, too, a child with autism requires medical care, but he also 
requires appropriate accommodations and therapies in school to benefit from his 
education.  For more on medical-legal partnerships, see the National Center For 
Medical-Legal Partnership website.  NATIONAL CENTER FOR MEDICAL-LEGAL 
PARTNERSHIP, http://www.medical-legalpartnership.org. 
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education in an attempt to ease the resource grab in school 
districts.158  This paper can rightfully be added to that call.   
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
The process of ensuring a free appropriate public education 
for a disabled child under the IDEA is rife with tensions and 
asymmetries between parents and school districts.  Some of these 
asymmetries—particularly regarding expertise between parents and 
school districts—are inherent, and not the product of congressional 
design.  Procedural safeguards in the IDEA, such as the ability of 
parents to obtain an independent evaluation at public expense, does 
some work to alleviate this problem.  Other imbalances and tensions 
are the result of court decisions, under-funding for special education, 
and the fact that parents of special needs children often have limited 
financial resources.  In this world of limited resources, where the 
provision of special education is expensive but lawyers (to defend 
school districts from violations of the IDEA) are free for school 
districts with insurance, it is difficult to conceive how disabled 
students will receive the full guarantee of FAPE. 
At bottom, the problem with effective implementation of the 
IDEA is the problem of inadequate funding.  Assuming that Congress 
does not decide suddenly to fund fully special education, we are left 
with a hobbled system dependent on the good will of school 
personnel and effective advocacy by parents.  One of the saddest 
consequences is the breakdown of trust between parents and 
educators.  Parents should be able to trust their children’s schools to 
operate in their best interests.  But the tension between “free” and 
“appropriate” leads many schools to mask denial of services in 
assertions of inappropriateness.  As a result, parents feel dismissed 
and ignored when they advocate for their children’s needs.  This 
tension has eroded the collaborative nature of the IDEA and has 
turned it into a dishonest process of downplaying parental concerns 
in an effort to guard the school district’s budget. 
 
                                                          
158 See, e.g., IDEA Full Funding Act, S. 1403, 112th Cong. (2011).  This 
bill was introduced by Senator Harkin in July 2011.  This bill has been introduced 
in the past as well.  See IDEA Full Funding Act, S. 1652, 111th Cong. (2009). 
